An Analysis of the Creamy Layer Principle in the Context of SC/ST Sub-classification: The State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh (2024) Judgment

I. Introduction

A. Setting the Context

The Supreme Court of India, on August 1, 2024, delivered a significant judgment in State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh.¹ This decision, rendered by a seven-judge Constitution Bench, addressed the complex and constitutionally charged issue of whether State governments possess the power to sub-classify Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) for the purpose of apportioning reservation benefits in public employment and education.¹ The case arose from challenges to state actions, notably by Punjab, which sought to provide preferential treatment to certain SC groups deemed more backward than others within the state’s SC list.³

B. Overturning E.V. Chinnaiah

The Davinder Singh judgment stands as a landmark primarily because, by a decisive 6:1 majority, it overruled the Court’s earlier five-judge bench decision in E.V. Chinnaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2004).¹ The Chinnaiah ruling had held that the Scheduled Castes, once identified by the President under Article 341 of the Constitution, form a single, homogenous group for the purpose of reservation benefits.¹ Consequently, Chinnaiah concluded that any attempt by a state legislature to sub-classify these groups for differential reservation benefits would amount to impermissible ‘tinkering’ with the Presidential List, a power exclusively vested in Parliament under Article 341(2).³

C. Report Focus

While the core issue in Davinder Singh was the permissibility of sub-classification, the judgment also carries significant implications for another contentious aspect of reservation jurisprudence: the ‘creamy layer’ principle. This report undertakes a focused analysis of the Davinder Singh judgment specifically concerning its discussion, affirmation, and potential ramifications of the creamy layer concept in relation to the newly validated sub-classification within SCs and STs. The significance of this analysis stems from the historical context where the creamy layer principle, established for Other Backward Classes (OBCs) in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992), was initially deemed inapplicable to SCs/STs due to their presumed inherent and extreme backwardness. However, later judgments, notably M. Nagaraj v. Union of India (2006) and Jarnail Singh v. Lachhmi Narain Gupta (2018), extended the principle to SCs/STs, albeit specifically in the context of reservations in promotion. Davinder Singh provides a crucial update on the Court’s thinking regarding the broader applicability of this principle to SCs/STs, especially when linked with sub-classification.

D. Roadmap

This report will proceed as follows: Section II will outline the core reasoning of the Davinder Singh majority on the permissibility of SC/ST sub-classification, focusing on the principles of heterogeneity and substantive equality. Section III will briefly trace the evolution of the creamy layer principle in Indian reservation law. Section IV will delve into the specific pronouncements on the creamy layer within the Davinder Singh judgment, analyzing the majority and concurring opinions, its connection to sub-classification, the question of distinct criteria, and the dissenting view. Section V will synthesize the interplay between substantive equality, sub-classification, and the creamy layer as conceptualized in the judgment. Finally, Section VI will conclude with a summary of findings and discuss the significant implications and challenges arising from the judgment’s stance on the creamy layer principle for SCs and STs.

II. The Davinder Singh Ruling on Sub-classification of SCs/STs

A. Permissibility of Sub-classification

The central holding of the seven-judge bench in Davinder Singh, delivered with a 6:1 majority, is that State governments are constitutionally empowered to create sub-classifications within the lists of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for the purpose of apportioning reservation benefits provided under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution.¹ This ruling directly reverses the prohibition established in E.V. Chinnaiah.¹

B. Rationale: Heterogeneity and Substantive Equality

The Court’s departure from Chinnaiah was primarily anchored in its rejection of the premise that SCs and STs constitute homogenous groups.¹ The majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, acknowledged that while communities listed as SCs share the common historical burden of untouchability and associated discrimination, and STs face unique challenges related to isolation and distinct cultural identities, there exists significant heterogeneity within these broad categories.² This heterogeneity manifests in varying degrees of social, economic, and educational backwardness among different castes and tribes included in the respective Presidential lists.² The Court cited empirical evidence and historical context to support this finding of internal disparities.⁶

This recognition of heterogeneity led the Court to emphasize substantive equality as the guiding constitutional principle, moving beyond mere formal equality. Formal equality demands treating all members of a group identically, whereas substantive equality requires acknowledging existing inequalities and tailoring measures to achieve genuine equality of opportunity and outcome. The Court reasoned that treating unequal groups within the SC/ST list equally under a uniform reservation quota could perpetuate, rather than alleviate, inequality, as the relatively more advanced groups might corner the benefits.⁵ Sub-classification, therefore, was viewed as a necessary tool for the State to implement its constitutional obligation under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) effectively, ensuring that reservation benefits “trickle down” and reach the “most disadvantaged” or “most backward” sections within the SC/ST communities.¹ This marks a firm shift in the equality paradigm for SC/ST reservations, moving away from the Chinnaiah view of homogeneity towards acknowledging the lived realities of graded inequality within these groups, thereby aligning the reservation policy more closely with the concept of substantive equality developed in earlier landmark cases like State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas and Indra Sawhney.

C. Interpretation of Article 14 (Equality Clause)

The Court grounded the permissibility of sub-classification within the framework of Article 14, which guarantees “equality before the law” and “equal protection of the laws”. ‘Equality before the law’ was interpreted as a negative concept implying the absence of special privileges, while ‘equal protection of the laws’ was seen as a positive concept enjoining the State to treat equals equally and, crucially, unequals unequally.

The Court held that sub-classification is a legitimate facet of the ‘reasonable classification’ doctrine, long established under Article 14 jurisprudence.¹ This doctrine permits the legislature to treat different groups differently, provided the classification meets the twin tests: (i) it must be founded on an ‘intelligible differentia’ that distinguishes the group being classified from others left out, and (ii) the differentia must have a ‘rational nexus’ to the object sought to be achieved by the law. In the context of SC/ST sub-classification, the intelligible differentia lies in the varying degrees of backwardness and inadequate representation among different castes/tribes within the SC/ST list.³ The rational nexus connects this differentiation to the objective of achieving substantive equality by ensuring that affirmative action benefits reach the most marginalized sections.²

Furthermore, the Court reiterated that Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness.¹⁵ Any sub-classification must, therefore, be based on objective, empirical data demonstrating genuine disparities and inadequacy of representation, and cannot be driven by arbitrary considerations or political expediency.²

D. Reconciling with Article 341/342 (Presidential Lists)

A significant hurdle overcome by the Davinder Singh majority was the Chinnaiah court’s interpretation of Article 341 (and by analogy, Article 342 for STs). Chinnaiah had viewed any state-level sub-classification as interfering with the exclusive power of Parliament, under Article 341(2), to include or exclude castes from the Presidential list.³

The Davinder Singh majority countered this by drawing a distinction between the identification function of Articles 341/342 and the implementation function related to reservations under Articles 15(4)/16(4).¹ The Court held that the purpose of the Presidential lists under Articles 341(1) and 342(1) is primarily to identify which communities are deemed SCs or STs for the purposes of the Constitution.¹ This identification creates a class eligible for constitutional benefits.

However, the Court reasoned, the act of sub-classifying these already identified groups for the purpose of distributing reservation benefits more equitably does not constitute ‘inclusion’ in or ‘exclusion’ from the list itself.¹ The state is not altering the composition of the list – which remains Parliament’s exclusive domain under Article 341(2)/342(2) – but is merely managing the allocation of benefits amongst those already included in the list, based on their relative backwardness and representation levels.¹ The Court referred to the Presidential list as a “legal fiction” ⁴ created for the purpose of identification, which does not necessarily imply empirical homogeneity for all other purposes, including the distribution of reservation benefits.

This interpretation effectively decouples the identification and implementation aspects. It preserves Parliament’s exclusive power over the composition of the SC/ST lists under Art. 341/342 ¹ while empowering States, under the enabling provisions of Art. 15(4)/16(4), to address the practicalities of benefit distribution based on demonstrated internal disparities.¹ This allows for flexibility in achieving substantive equality without directly contradicting the textual limitations of Art. 341(2)/342(2).

This stands in contrast to Justice Bela Trivedi’s dissenting opinion, which adhered closer to the Chinnaiah view, maintaining that the Presidential list creates a homogenous class for reservation purposes and that any sub-classification by states constitutes impermissible tinkering.¹

E. Requirement of Empirical Data

Crucially, the Court underscored that the power to sub-classify is not unfettered. Any such exercise by the State must be rigorously justified by quantifiable and empirical data.¹ This data must demonstrate the existence of significant inter-se backwardness among the SC/ST groups within the state and establish the inadequate representation of the specific sub-group(s) being accorded preferential treatment in public services or educational institutions.¹ The Court also affirmed that such state actions, based on the collected data and the rationale for sub-classification, remain subject to judicial review to ensure they meet the standards of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness under Article 14.²

III. Evolution of the Creamy Layer Principle

A. Origins for OBCs (Indra Sawhney, 1992)

The concept of the ‘creamy layer’ entered Indian constitutional discourse definitively with the nine-judge bench decision in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992). This case, famously known as the Mandal Commission case, upheld the constitutional validity of providing 27% reservation for Other Backward Classes (OBCs) in central government services. However, the Court simultaneously introduced the principle of exclusion based on the ‘creamy layer’.

The principle mandates the exclusion of socially and economically advanced members from within a designated backward class (specifically OBCs in the Indra Sawhney context) from the benefits of reservation. The rationale was rooted in the idea that reservation is meant to address backwardness, and once individuals or sections within a backward class overcome that backwardness, they should no longer be eligible for affirmative action, thereby allowing the benefits to percolate down to the more deserving and genuinely needy members of that class.

Critically, the Indra Sawhney judgment explicitly stated that the creamy layer principle was not applicable to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The Court reasoned that SCs and STs belong to distinct categories whose backwardness was historically rooted in extreme social discrimination (untouchability for SCs) and isolation, making them inherently backward as a whole, unlike the OBCs whose backwardness was primarily social and educational.

B. Extension to SC/ST Promotions (M. Nagaraj, 2006 & Jarnail Singh, 2018)

The exclusion of SCs/STs from the creamy layer principle was revisited in the context of reservations in promotions. Following constitutional amendments (77th, 81st, 85th) that enabled reservation in promotion for SCs/STs, the validity of these amendments was challenged.

In M. Nagaraj v. Union of India (2006), a five-judge bench upheld the constitutional validity of Article 16(4A) and 16(4B), which permit reservation in promotion with consequential seniority for SCs/STs. However, the Court imposed stringent conditions for the exercise of this power by the State. It required the State to demonstrate, with quantifiable data, the continuing backwardness of the SC/ST group concerned, the inadequacy of their representation in the relevant posts, and ensure that the reservation policy did not adversely affect overall administrative efficiency (Article 335). Significantly, Nagaraj controversially held that the creamy layer principle would apply to SCs and STs in the context of promotions.

This position was further refined in Jarnail Singh v. Lachhmi Narain Gupta (2018). Another five-judge bench in Jarnail Singh upheld the application of the creamy layer principle to SC/ST promotions as laid down in Nagaraj. However, it overruled the Nagaraj requirement for the State to collect quantifiable data to prove the backwardness of SCs/STs for promotions. The Court reasoned that the backwardness of SCs/STs is constitutionally presumed due to their inclusion in the Presidential lists under Articles 341 and 342. Nevertheless, Jarnail Singh maintained the necessity for the State to provide quantifiable data on the inadequacy of representation of SCs/STs in promotional posts and affirmed the obligation to exclude the creamy layer from such promotional reservations.

Thus, prior to Davinder Singh, the application of the creamy layer principle to SCs/STs was judicially mandated, but specifically within the contested domain of reservations in promotion, creating a complex and somewhat fragmented legal landscape. This application was judicially imposed, running counter to the explicit exclusion in Indra Sawhney and arguably Parliament’s intent when enacting the promotional reservation amendments.

IV. The Creamy Layer Principle in Davinder Singh

A. Explicit Affirmation of Applicability to SCs/STs

The Davinder Singh judgment marks a significant development by explicitly affirming the applicability of the creamy layer principle to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes more broadly, seemingly beyond the confines of promotions alone.¹ While not the central issue under reference, this affirmation emerged strongly through the concurring opinions, commanding a majority within the seven-judge bench.

Justice B.R. Gavai, in his concurring opinion (joined by Justices Vikram Nath, Pankaj Mithal, and Satish Chandra Sharma), stated unequivocally that the findings in Nagaraj, Jarnail Singh, and the present Davinder Singh case “to the effect that creamy layer principle is also applicable to SC/STs lays down the correct position of law”.¹⁴ His reasoning pivoted on the concept of achieving real equality, which necessitates treating unequals unequally.¹⁴ He argued that including SCs/STs who have significantly advanced socially, economically, and educationally due to past reservation benefits in the same category as those still facing acute deprivation would defeat the constitutional mandate.¹⁴ Justice Gavai vividly illustrated this by contrasting the opportunities available to the children of high-ranking SC/ST officers with those available to children of manual labourers in villages, concluding that grouping them together for reservation purposes would be contrary to the goal of real equality.¹⁴ Justice Pankaj Mithal, in his separate concurrence, strongly endorsed this view, suggesting that reservation benefits should ideally be restricted to only one generation within a family to prevent perpetuation of privilege.³ Justice Satish Chandra Sharma added that identifying and excluding the creamy layer should be considered a “constitutional imperative” for achieving substantive equality among SCs/STs.³

B. Connection to Sub-classification

The Court, particularly in the concurring opinions, drew a conceptual link between the creamy layer principle and the justification for sub-classification.³ Both mechanisms are presented as instruments aimed at achieving substantive equality by ensuring that the benefits of affirmative action are targeted towards the most backward segments within the broader SC/ST categories.³

The reasoning implicitly suggests that if the exclusion of the creamy layer – the advanced individuals within a specific SC/ST caste – is constitutionally permissible and does not amount to ‘tinkering’ with the Presidential list (as affirmed in Jarnail Singh and reiterated here), then providing preferential treatment to the most backward sub-groups – the less advanced castes within the overall SC/ST list – should logically also be permissible.³ Both actions involve differentiation within the SC/ST list based on relative backwardness. If excluding the ‘top’ (creamy layer) is constitutionally valid under Articles 14 and 16 and does not violate Article 341/342, then prioritizing the ‘bottom’ (most backward sub-castes) should also be valid, as both serve the goal of refining reservation for substantive equality.³ This thematic linkage bolsters the argument for sub-classification by drawing an analogy with the creamy layer principle, even though the latter was not the primary question referred to the bench.

C. Criteria for SC/ST Creamy Layer

A crucial aspect emerging from the concurring opinions is the acknowledgment that the criteria for identifying the creamy layer among SCs and STs might need to be different from those applied to OBCs.¹ Justice Gavai explicitly stated, “The criteria for exclusion of the creamy layer from the SCs and STs for the purpose of affirmative action could be different from the criteria as applicable to the Other Backward Classes”.¹⁴ Justices Nath, Mithal, and Sharma concurred with this view.¹

However, the judgment stops short of defining what these different criteria should entail.¹⁴ It leaves the task of formulating a specific policy for identifying the SC/ST creamy layer to the State.³ This acknowledgment stems from the understanding that the historical and social basis of backwardness for SCs (rooted primarily in untouchability and extreme social exclusion) and STs (often linked to geographical isolation and distinct cultural practices) differs significantly from the primarily social and educational backwardness criteria used for identifying OBCs.⁹ Simply transposing the income and occupational criteria developed for OBCs post-Indra Sawhney might not accurately capture the point at which an individual belonging to an SC or ST community has overcome the deep-seated disadvantages associated with their identity. This opens the door for developing context-specific, potentially more stringent or differently focused, criteria for SC/ST creamy layer exclusion, but simultaneously presents a significant policy formulation challenge for the government.

D. Dissenting View (Justice Trivedi)

Justice Bela M. Trivedi, in her dissent, fundamentally disagreed with the majority’s premise regarding both sub-classification and, implicitly, the extension of the Indra Sawhney framework (including aspects like creamy layer applicability as discussed for OBCs) to SCs/STs.¹ She maintained that the Chinnaiah decision correctly interpreted the Constitution, viewing SCs as a constitutionally homogenous group for reservation purposes.³ In her view, the Indra Sawhney discussion on sub-classification and creamy layer was explicitly confined to OBCs and should not be applied to SCs/STs, whose identification and constitutional status are governed by the distinct mechanism of Articles 341 and 342.³ She cited Ashok Kumar Thakur v. Union of India, where a five-judge bench had held the creamy layer principle inapplicable to SCs/STs.¹¹ Thus, her dissent rejects the foundational logic used by the majority to permit sub-classification and affirm creamy layer applicability for SCs/STs.

E. Scope of Application (Appointments/Education)

While the Davinder Singh judgment arose in the context of state laws affecting reservations generally (including initial appointments and potentially education, as in the Punjab context ³), the explicit affirmation of the creamy layer principle often references the precedents of Nagaraj and Jarnail Singh, which dealt specifically with promotions.³ However, the broad framing of the affirmation by Justice Gavai and the concurring judges – linking it to the overarching goal of achieving “real equality” through affirmative action ¹⁴ – strongly suggests an intended general applicability. Applying the creamy layer only to promotions while allowing advanced sections to benefit from initial appointments and educational reservations would seem inconsistent with the substantive equality rationale championed by the majority. Therefore, while the judgment’s primary focus remained sub-classification, the likely implication is that the affirmed creamy layer principle is intended to apply across all domains of SC/ST reservation, subject to the formulation of appropriate, potentially distinct, criteria by the State.

Table: Evolution of Creamy Layer Application to SCs/STs in Supreme Court Judgments

Judgment (Case Name & Year)	Context (Category; Domain)	Key Finding on Creamy Layer Applicability to SC/ST	Rationale/Remarks
Indra Sawhney v. UoI (1992)	OBC; Initial Appointments	Not Applicable to SCs/STs	SCs/STs considered inherently backward, distinct from OBCs; creamy layer concept confined to OBCs.
M. Nagaraj v. UoI (2006)	SC/ST; Promotions (Art. 16(4A))	Applicable	Upheld Art. 16(4A) but imposed conditions, including creamy layer exclusion, for reservation in promotion for SCs/STs. Required data on backwardness, representation, and efficiency.
Jarnail Singh v. L.N. Gupta (2018)	SC/ST; Promotions (Art. 16(4A))	Applicable	Upheld creamy layer application from Nagaraj. Struck down need for data on SC/ST backwardness (presumed), but retained need for data on inadequate representation and creamy layer exclusion.
Davinder Singh (2024) – Majority/Concurring 1	SC/ST; General (in context of Sub-classification)	Applicable 1	Affirms Nagaraj/Jarnail findings as correct law. Necessary for achieving real/substantive equality by targeting benefits. Criteria for SC/ST creamy layer could differ from OBC criteria.1
Davinder Singh (2024) – Dissent (Trivedi J.) 1	SC/ST; General (in context of Sub-classification)	Not Applicable (Implicitly, by rejecting extension of Indra Sawhney framework to SCs) 1	Indra Sawhney‘s creamy layer discussion confined to OBCs. SCs constitutionally homogenous for reservation; sub-classification/creamy layer application amounts to impermissible tinkering with Art. 341.3

V. Synthesizing Substantive Equality, Sub-classification, and Creamy Layer

A. The Unifying Principle: Substantive Equality

A careful reading of the Davinder Singh judgment reveals that the Court’s validation of sub-classification and its affirmation of the creamy layer principle for SCs/STs are not disparate pronouncements but emanate from a unified commitment to the constitutional goal of substantive equality. The judgment conceptualizes both mechanisms as necessary tools to refine the application of reservation policy, moving beyond the limitations of formal equality – which treats all members of the SC/ST category alike – towards a framework that acknowledges and addresses the real, existing inequalities within these groups.¹ Both sub-classification (by prioritizing the most backward sub-groups) and creamy layer exclusion (by removing the most advanced individuals) are framed as methods to ensure that the benefits of affirmative action effectively reach those who need them most, thereby operationalizing the promise of substantive equality enshrined in Articles 14, 15, and 16.¹

B. Interplay and Potential Tension

Sub-classification and creamy layer exclusion can be seen as complementary strategies targeting different dimensions of intra-group inequality. Sub-classification addresses disparities between different castes or tribes within the broader SC/ST list, aiming to uplift entire sub-groups that lag behind others. Creamy layer exclusion, conversely, addresses disparities within a specific caste or tribe (or sub-group), aiming to prevent the monopolization of benefits by the most privileged individuals within that community.

However, their simultaneous application could create practical complexities. For instance, an aggressive application of creamy layer criteria might significantly shrink the eligible pool within a sub-classified group intended for preferential treatment, potentially undermining the objective of ensuring adequate representation for that specific backward sub-group. States implementing both policies will need to carefully calibrate the criteria for each to avoid unintended consequences. The administrative burden of collecting distinct sets of data – one focusing on group-level backwardness and representation for sub-classification, and another potentially focusing on individual/family-level advancement for creamy layer exclusion – will be substantial.

C. Efficiency vs. Equality

The judgment also briefly touches upon the perennial tension between reservation and administrative efficiency, often invoked under Article 335. The majority opinion in Davinder Singh, following Jarnail Singh, appears to dilute the stringent interpretation of Article 335 adopted in Nagaraj. It suggests that the concern for efficiency in Article 335 should not operate as a fundamental limitation on the State’s power to implement reservation policies under Article 16(4) and 16(4A).⁵ This reinforces the overarching theme that the pursuit of substantive equality and the redressal of historical disadvantage are primary constitutional objectives, potentially taking precedence over abstract concerns about administrative efficiency sometimes associated with affirmative action policies.

The Davinder Singh judgment, therefore, presents sub-classification and creamy layer exclusion as intrinsically linked tools, two sides of the same coin, designed to operationalize substantive equality within the SC/ST reservation framework by addressing both inter-group and intra-group disparities.

VI. Conclusion and Implications

A. Summary of Findings

The seven-judge Constitution Bench in State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh (2024) has significantly reshaped the landscape of reservation policy for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in India. By overruling E.V. Chinnaiah ¹, the Court definitively held that States possess the constitutional authority under Articles 14, 15(4), and 16(4) to sub-classify SCs and STs based on demonstrable inter-se backwardness and inadequate representation, provided such classification is supported by empirical data and is not arbitrary.¹

Crucially for this analysis, the judgment, primarily through its concurring opinions which commanded a majority on this point, explicitly affirmed the applicability of the ‘creamy layer’ principle to SCs and STs.¹ This affirmation extends the principle beyond its previous application limited to promotions (Nagaraj, Jarnail Singh). Furthermore, the Court indicated that the criteria for identifying the creamy layer among SCs and STs need not be identical to those used for OBCs, acknowledging the distinct nature of their historical backwardness, though it left the formulation of these specific criteria to the State.¹ Both sub-classification and creamy layer exclusion were framed as constitutionally valid tools to achieve substantive equality by ensuring reservation benefits reach the most deserving within these communities.¹

B. Implications for State Policy

The Davinder Singh judgment grants state governments considerable latitude in tailoring reservation policies for SCs and STs.¹² States are now explicitly empowered to:

1. Identify the most backward groups within their SC/ST lists and provide them preferential treatment through sub-classification.
2. Implement mechanisms to exclude the ‘creamy layer’ from SC/ST reservation benefits across various domains (potentially including initial appointments and education, not just promotions).

This empowers states to address concerns about the inequitable distribution of reservation benefits, where certain dominant castes within the SC/ST list or advanced individuals might disproportionately benefit. Justice Gavai’s opinion even suggests a constitutional imperative for the State to act on the creamy layer front.³

C. Challenges Ahead

Despite the legal clarity provided on the permissibility of these measures, their implementation poses significant challenges for state governments ¹²:

1. Data Collection: Gathering reliable, comprehensive, and quantifiable data on inter-se backwardness among numerous SC/ST communities, their representation levels across various tiers of public service and education, and the socio-economic status of individuals/families for creamy layer identification is a massive administrative undertaking.¹² The methodology for data collection and analysis itself could become contentious.
2. Defining Criteria: Formulating objective, rational, and constitutionally sound criteria for both sub-classification (defining ‘most backward’ and ‘inadequate representation’ thresholds) and, particularly, for the SC/ST creamy layer will be extremely complex.¹² The judgment offers little guidance on how SC/ST creamy layer criteria should differ from OBC criteria, leaving a policy vacuum that invites debate and potential legal challenges.
3. Political Sensitivity and Potential for Manipulation: Both sub-classification and creamy layer identification are politically charged issues. There is a risk that decisions regarding which groups to prioritize or which criteria to use for exclusion could be influenced by political considerations rather than objective data, potentially leading to further litigation and social friction.²
4. Identity Fragmentation: Critics argue that sub-classification might lead to the fragmentation of the collective SC/ST identity, potentially weakening their political bargaining power and shifting the focus from addressing overarching caste/tribe-based discrimination to managing internal hierarchies.⁵ There are also concerns that focusing heavily on economic criteria (implicit in creamy layer) deviates from the original rationale of reservation as a remedy for historical social stigmatization and discrimination.⁵

D. Final Assessment

The State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh judgment represents a pivotal moment in India’s equality jurisprudence. It firmly entrenches the principle of substantive equality as the primary lens through which SC/ST reservation policies should be viewed and implemented. By validating sub-classification and affirming the creamy layer principle for SCs/STs, the Supreme Court has provided states with tools to address the complex reality of intra-group disparities.

However, in resolving the legal question of permissibility, the Court has simultaneously opened a Pandora’s box of implementation challenges. The judgment shifts a significant burden onto state governments to gather extensive empirical data and formulate nuanced, defensible policies for both sub-classification and creamy layer exclusion, particularly the latter, where the criteria remain undefined. The path forward is likely to involve considerable policy experimentation, political negotiation, and further judicial scrutiny as states grapple with the practicalities of translating the Court’s vision of substantive equality into reality for the most marginalized sections within the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The success of this endeavor will depend critically on the ability of states to navigate these challenges with objectivity, transparency, and a genuine commitment to the constitutional promise of equality for all.

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