Evolution and Application of Constitutional Tort Jurisprudence in India

A Public Law Remedy for Fundamental Rights Violations:

I. Defining Constitutional Tort in the Indian Legal Framework

A. Conceptual Foundations in Tort Law

The concept of ‘tort’ forms a significant branch of civil law, concerned primarily with the protection of various interests arising within society.¹ Derived from the Latin word ‘tortum’, meaning ‘to twist’, it equates to the English word ‘wrong’.² In essence, a tort signifies a civil wrong, distinct from a breach of contract or trust, where the primary remedy sought is an action for unliquidated damages – damages whose quantum is determined by the court based on the circumstances of the case.² It involves the violation of a legal right vested in another person, or conversely, the breach of a legal duty owed by the wrongdoer towards the victim.¹ The law imposes duties to respect the legal rights of others, and a breach constitutes a wrongful act.¹

The law of torts in India, much like in England from where it was primarily imported during the colonial era, remains largely uncodified.¹ While specific areas like workmen’s compensation, motor vehicle accidents, and consumer protection have seen legislative codification, the general principles of tortious liability are predominantly judge-made, requiring analysis through judicial pronouncements.¹ Indian courts often follow principles of English law, adapting them where necessary to suit Indian conditions, although the volume of tort litigation has historically been considered relatively low.¹ Foundational to tort law is the maxim Ubi Jus Ibi Remedium, signifying that where there exists a legal right, there must also exist a legal remedy for its violation.²

Historically, the liability of the State in tort has been circumscribed by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, an inheritance from English common law based on the maxim “the King can do no wrong”.¹ This doctrine traditionally distinguished between the ‘sovereign’ functions of the State (like defence, administration of justice) and ‘non-sovereign’ functions (activities that could be performed by private entities). Liability was generally admitted only for torts committed during the exercise of non-sovereign functions.¹ This distinction, however, proved increasingly problematic in the context of a modern welfare state with expanding governmental activities.⁴

B. Emergence as a Public Law Remedy for Fundamental Rights Violations

Against this backdrop, ‘constitutional tort’ emerged in India not merely as an extension of private law principles but as a distinct public law remedy.⁶ It has been devised and developed primarily by the higher judiciary – the Supreme Court of India under Article 32 and the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution – exercising their writ jurisdiction.⁶ This remedy specifically addresses violations of fundamental rights, enshrined in Part III of the Constitution, particularly the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21, committed by the State or its instrumentalities.⁶

The core of this remedy lies in the award of monetary compensation to the victim as a means of redressal and enforcing accountability for the violation of these cherished rights.⁶ It represents a significant judicial innovation, crafted to fill a void where traditional private law remedies were often found to be inadequate, procedurally cumbersome, expensive, or inaccessible, especially for the disadvantaged sections of society who might lack the wherewithal to pursue lengthy civil litigation.⁶ The development of constitutional tort underscores the judiciary’s proactive role in adapting legal mechanisms to uphold constitutional values, particularly when faced with state actions infringing upon fundamental freedoms.

The purpose of awarding compensation in constitutional tort extends beyond merely indemnifying the victim. It serves crucial public law objectives: ensuring compliance with the constitutional mandate, particularly Article 21; acting as a deterrent against future violations by state authorities; and affirming the practical significance of fundamental rights.⁶ As the Supreme Court observed, making fundamental rights meaningful often requires the courts to “forge new tools and devise new remedies” ¹⁷, and monetary compensation was recognized as one such “telling way” to prevent violations.⁶ It aims to provide “some palliative for the unlawful acts of instrumentalities which act in the name of public interest”.¹³

C. Key Distinctions: Constitutional Tort vs. Private Law Tort

Understanding the unique nature of constitutional tort requires differentiating it clearly from traditional private law tort actions.

1. Jurisdictional Basis: Constitutional tort is fundamentally a public law remedy, invoked through the writ jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (Article 32) and High Courts (Article 226).⁶ In contrast, traditional tort actions are pursued under private law in civil courts, based on established principles of tortious liability.¹
2. Source of Liability: Liability in constitutional tort arises directly from the breach of a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, committed by the State or its agents.⁶ Private law tort liability stems from the breach of a general legal duty (duty of care, duty not to defame, etc.) owed to individuals, as recognized under common law or specific statutes.¹
3. Applicability of Sovereign Immunity: This is a critical distinction. The defence of sovereign immunity, which historically shielded the State from liability for acts performed in its ‘sovereign’ capacity in traditional tort law, has been unequivocally held to be inapplicable to public law proceedings for the enforcement of fundamental rights.⁵ The State cannot plead sovereign functions as a defence when its actions violate fundamental rights.
4. Nature and Philosophy of Compensation: While the primary remedy in both is often monetary compensation, the underlying philosophy may differ. Traditional tort damages often aim at restitutio in integrum – restoring the claimant to the position they would have been in had the tort not occurred.¹⁶ Constitutional tort compensation, however, may serve broader purposes. It acknowledges the constitutional gravity of the infringement and may consider factors like deterrence, upholding the rule of law, and ensuring respect for constitutional rights, potentially even without strict proof of quantifiable loss or injury in the conventional tort sense.¹⁶ The focus shifts from mere loss restoration to vindicating the fundamental right itself.

This clear demarcation between the public law remedy of constitutional tort and private law actions is essential. Constitutional tort is not merely a procedural shortcut for a standard tort claim against the State; it is a substantively distinct remedy grounded in constitutional principles, designed specifically to address the unique power imbalance between the citizen and the State and to provide effective redress for violations of the most basic human rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

D. The Principle of Strict Liability

A cornerstone of constitutional tort jurisprudence in India is the application of the principle of strict liability.⁶ Once it is established that a fundamental right of an individual has been infringed by the State or its agents, the State becomes liable to pay compensation.¹⁴ Liability attaches irrespective of whether the infringement occurred due to negligence or intention; the mere fact of the violation is sufficient to trigger liability.¹⁸ This approach underscores the paramount importance accorded to fundamental rights within the constitutional scheme and reflects the State’s absolute and non-delegable duty to protect these rights, particularly the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21.¹⁴ The rejection of fault-based liability in this context ensures a more effective and certain remedy for the victim.

II. The Genesis and Evolution of Constitutional Tort Jurisprudence in India

A. Historical Context: State Liability and Sovereign Immunity Pre-Constitution

The origins of state liability in India are deeply intertwined with the colonial past and the transplantation of English common law principles.⁴ Central to this was the doctrine of sovereign immunity, encapsulated in the maxim “The King can do no wrong,” which posited that the sovereign could not be sued in its own courts without consent.¹ During British rule, this doctrine found application in India, albeit with a distinction drawn between the ‘sovereign’ and ‘non-sovereign’ functions of the State.⁴ Liability was generally accepted for torts committed by government servants during the discharge of non-sovereign functions (commercial activities, maintenance of property not linked to traditional state functions), but immunity was often claimed for acts related to sovereign functions (defence, administration of justice, policing).¹ Foundational cases from the colonial era, such as P & O Steam Navigation Co. v. Secretary of State for India (1861), cemented this distinction, though its application often led to ambiguity and perceived injustice.⁴ The Government of India Acts of 1915 and 1935 largely continued this framework, linking the liability of the government to that of the former East India Company, thus perpetuating the sovereign/non-sovereign dichotomy.¹

B. Post-Independence Developments: Impact of the Constitution and Welfare State Ideals

The adoption of the Constitution of India in 1950 marked a pivotal moment, yet it did not immediately resolve the issue of state liability. Article 300(1) addressed the capacity of the Union and State governments to sue and be sued, but critically, it stipulated that their liability would be the same as that which existed before the Constitution.⁵ This effectively carried forward the pre-existing legal position, including the vexed doctrine of sovereign immunity, without providing explicit legislative guidance on the extent of the State’s tortious liability.⁵

However, the Constitution also introduced a powerful countervailing force: Part III, guaranteeing fundamental rights to all citizens. Foremost among these were Article 21, safeguarding the right to life and personal liberty, and Article 32, providing a guaranteed right to move the Supreme Court for the enforcement of these rights.⁶ These provisions laid the constitutional foundation upon which the edifice of constitutional tort would later be constructed.

Simultaneously, independent India embraced the philosophy of a welfare state.⁴ This led to a significant expansion of governmental activities, moving beyond traditional sovereign roles into areas like commerce, industry, and social services.¹ This increased state intervention inevitably heightened the interface between the State and the citizen, consequently increasing the potential for state actions to adversely impact individual rights and well-being.¹ The blurring lines between sovereign and non-sovereign functions in this new paradigm, coupled with the constitutional guarantee of fundamental rights, created a compelling need for enhanced state accountability.⁴

C. Early Judicial Seeds and Milestones

In the initial decades following independence, the judiciary grappled with the inherited doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court’s decision in Kasturi Lal Ralia Ram Jain v. State of U.P. (1965) became a significant, though often criticized, reference point. In Kasturi Lal, the court upheld the State’s immunity from liability for the loss of gold seized by the police and misappropriated by a head constable, classifying police functions related to the seizure of suspected stolen property as falling within the exercise of sovereign powers.¹⁴ This decision seemingly reinforced the traditional immunity doctrine.

However, judicial unease with the doctrine persisted, particularly in the context of a democratic republic committed to fundamental rights.⁴ A gradual shift towards greater accountability was discernible. Cases like State of Rajasthan v. Vidyawati (1962) saw the court holding the State liable for the negligence of a government jeep driver engaged in a non-sovereign activity (returning from a workshop after repairs), distinguishing it from purely sovereign acts.¹⁰

The true turning point arrived in the early 1980s, fueled by judicial activism and a growing emphasis on the enforcement of fundamental rights, especially Article 21.⁷ The Khatri v. State of Bihar cases (1981), arising from the horrific Bhagalpur blindings, saw the Supreme Court forcefully assert its duty to forge new remedies for enforcing fundamental rights, suggesting that compensation could be awarded for violations of Article 21.¹⁴ While compensation wasn’t ultimately awarded in Khatri due to procedural issues, it laid the crucial groundwork for the explicit emergence of compensatory jurisprudence under Article 32.

D. Role of Law Commission Reports in Shaping Discourse

The Law Commission of India played a significant, albeit initially unheeded, role in advocating for reform of state liability law. As early as 1956, its First Report critically examined the doctrine of sovereign immunity, deeming it anachronistic and unsuitable for a welfare state.⁴ The Commission forcefully argued that there was “no convincing reason” why the government should not be placed in the same position as a private employer regarding tortious liability.⁵ It recommended the abolition of the sovereign/non-sovereign distinction and the enactment of legislation modelled perhaps on the UK’s Crown Proceedings Act 1947 or the US Federal Tort Claims Act 1946, to make the State liable for the torts of its employees.⁵

Based on these recommendations, the Government (Liability in Tort) Bill was introduced in Parliament in 1965 and again in subsequent years, but these legislative attempts ultimately failed, lapsing without enactment.⁵ The stated reason for allowing the bills to lapse was a concern that legislation might introduce undue rigidity in determining government liability.⁵ This legislative inaction left the field open, compelling the judiciary to address the issue through interpretation and the development of common law principles, eventually leading to the innovation of constitutional tort.

Later Law Commission reports continued to address specific aspects of state accountability and compensation. The 277th Report (2018) on Wrongful Prosecution (Miscarriage of Justice) explicitly recognized the limitations of existing remedies and recommended a specific legislative framework for compensating victims of wrongful prosecution, acknowledging the development of public law compensation by the courts.²³ Similarly, a 1985 report recommended inserting Section 114-B into the Indian Evidence Act to create a rebuttable presumption of culpability against police officials in cases of custodial death or torture, a recommendation that also remains unimplemented despite being introduced in a Bill as late as 2017.³⁰

The consistent stance of the Law Commission over decades, advocating for greater state accountability and legislative reform, underscores a significant gap between legal reformist thinking and actual legislative output. The judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, eventually stepped into this breach, utilizing the Constitution’s fundamental rights provisions to achieve, through interpretation, a measure of state accountability that the legislature had failed to codify. This evolution highlights a dynamic interplay between constitutional imperatives, inherited legal doctrines, the changing role of the state, legislative inertia, and judicial activism in shaping the unique doctrine of constitutional tort in India.

III. Landmark Supreme Court Judgments Shaping the Doctrine

The doctrine of constitutional tort in India has been meticulously shaped through a series of landmark pronouncements by the Supreme Court. These judgments not only established the principle of awarding compensation for fundamental rights violations but also progressively clarified its doctrinal basis, scope, and relationship with other remedies. The following table summarizes key cases, followed by a detailed analysis of the most significant ones.

Table: Landmark Constitutional Tort Cases in India

Case Name & Citation	Factual Summary	Constitutional Right(s) Violated	Key Legal Principle Established/Affirmed	Remedy Granted (Compensation)	Significance/Trend Noted
Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar (1983) 4 SCC 141	Illegal detention for 14 years post-acquittal. 6	Article 21	First explicit award of compensation under Art 32 for Art 21 violation. Rejected relegation to civil suit. Compensation as a “telling way” to enforce rights. Public law remedy recognized. Implicit strict liability. 6	Rs. 30,000/35,000 (Interim/Compensation). Without prejudice to civil suit. 6	Foundational case establishing constitutional tort and compensatory jurisprudence for fundamental rights. Marked shift from traditional remedies. 6
Sebastian M. Hongray v. Union of India (1984) 1 SCC 339	Disappearance of two persons after being taken by army personnel. 10	Article 21	Applied Rudul Sah. Awarded compensation for torture, agony, and failure to produce missing persons. 6	Exemplary costs awarded (amount not specified in snippets). 10	Extended compensatory principle to cases of disappearance involving armed forces. Consolidated Rudul Sah precedent. 6
Bhim Singh v. State of J&K (1985) 4 SCC 677	Illegal arrest and detention of an MLA to prevent assembly attendance. 10	Articles 21, 22(2)	Applied Rudul Sah and Hongray. Awarded compensation for illegal arrest violating fundamental rights. 6	Rs. 50,000. 10	Reinforced compensation for illegal detention by police, emphasizing violation of specific procedural rights (Art 22) alongside Art 21. 10
Saheli v. Commissioner of Police (1990) 1 SCC 422	Death of a 9-year-old child due to police beating. 10	Article 21	Held State (Delhi Admin) liable for compensation. Relied on Vidyawati for state liability for employee torts. Distinguished from Kasturi Lal. 6	Rs. 75,000 to the mother. 6	Applied compensatory principle to custodial death involving police brutality, reinforcing state’s vicarious liability in public law context. 10
Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa (1993) 2 SCC 746	Custodial death; discrepancy between police version and evidence. 6	Article 21	Declared compensation under Arts 32/226 as public law remedy based on strict liability. Held sovereign immunity inapplicable in this context. Distinguished from private law tort. Affirmed Rudul Sah line. Emphasized remedy for “have-nots”. 6	Rs. 1,50,000 to the mother. State left to determine official responsibility. 6	Firmly entrenched constitutional tort. Provided clear doctrinal basis (strict liability, no sovereign immunity). Crucial for custodial violence jurisprudence. 6
D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997) 1 SCC 416	Focused on procedural safeguards against custodial violence/torture. 30	Article 21	Linked breach of procedural guidelines to constitutional tort liability. Compensation is in addition to other remedies (departmental/criminal). Rights without remedies are illusory. Reaffirmed state liability & no sovereign immunity for Art 21 violations. 18	Guidelines established; compensation principle reinforced as additional remedy. 30	Integrated procedural duties with substantive compensatory remedy, creating a comprehensive framework against custodial abuse. 30
Kaushal Kishor v. State of UP (2023) 4 SCC 1	Derogatory statements by ministers about crime victims. Questions on horizontal rights, state duty, vicarious liability, tort via speech. 36	Articles 19, 21	Held Arts 19/21 enforceable against non-state actors. State has affirmative duty under Art 21 against private threats. Govt not vicariously liable for minister’s statement itself. Statement not actionable as constitutional tort unless it leads to state action/omission causing harm. 40	No compensation awarded based on statement alone. Clarification of principles. 41	Addressed horizontal application of rights and state duty. Limited scope of constitutional tort liability for speech acts by ministers, requiring causal link to state action/omission causing harm. 41

A. Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar (1983): Laying the Foundation

The case of Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar stands as a seminal moment in Indian constitutional jurisprudence, marking the explicit birth of the constitutional tort doctrine.⁶ Rudul Sah was arrested in 1953 for the alleged murder of his wife and subsequently acquitted by the Sessions Court in June 1968.¹² Despite his acquittal, he remained incarcerated for over 14 years, finally being released in October 1982 after a habeas corpus petition was filed on his behalf in the Supreme Court under Article 32.¹² The State’s defence, based on an unsubstantiated claim of insanity, was rejected by the Court as a “callous afterthought”.⁶

The core legal issue was whether the Supreme Court, under its Article 32 jurisdiction, could grant monetary compensation for the blatant violation of Rudul Sah’s fundamental right to life and personal liberty under Article 21.¹² The Court, led by Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, emphatically answered in the affirmative. It dismissed the State’s argument that Sah should be relegated to the ordinary remedy of a civil suit for damages, terming such a suggestion “stale and sterile” given the undisputed and egregious nature of the illegal detention.⁶

Crucially, the Court reasoned that the power under Article 32, itself a fundamental right, was not merely limited to issuing directions for release from illegal detention. To confine the remedy thus would be to strip Article 21 of its “significant content”.⁶ The Court declared that “one of the telling ways” to prevent the violation of Article 21 and ensure compliance with its mandate was to “mulct its violations in the payment of monetary compensation”.⁶ It recognized compensation as a “palliative for the unlawful acts of instrumentalities” acting under the shield of state power.¹³ While acknowledging the difficulty in precisely quantifying damages without evidence typically presented in a suit, the Court had “no doubt” that a decree for damages would have to be passed if a suit were filed.⁶

Consequently, the Supreme Court awarded Rudul Sah a sum of Rs. 30,000 (some sources mention Rs. 35,000 including a previous payment) as an interim measure or compensation, payable by the State of Bihar.⁶ This award was explicitly made without prejudice to his right to pursue a separate civil suit for appropriate damages against the State and the erring officials.⁶

Rudul Sah marked a paradigm shift.⁶ It was the first instance where the Supreme Court awarded monetary compensation for a fundamental rights violation under Article 32.¹² It firmly established constitutional tort as a public law remedy, distinct from private law, implicitly premised the State’s liability on a strict basis for such violations, and introduced compensation as a tool for deterrence and ensuring the meaningfulness of fundamental rights.⁶

B. Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa (1993): Clarifying Strict Liability and Sovereign Immunity

If Rudul Sah laid the foundation, Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa built the doctrinal superstructure, firmly entrenching constitutional tort within Indian law.⁶ The case involved the custodial death of Suman Behera, aged 22, who was taken into police custody in relation to a theft investigation.¹⁴ His dead body was later found on a railway track with multiple injuries.¹⁷ The police claimed he had escaped custody and was killed by a passing train.¹⁷ However, an inquiry ordered by the Supreme Court and conducted by the District Judge found, based on medical and other evidence (including the condition of a rope found on the body), that Suman Behera had died as a result of injuries inflicted upon him while in police custody.¹⁴ His mother, Nilabati Behera, approached the Supreme Court under Article 32 seeking compensation for the violation of her son’s Article 21 rights.¹⁴

The Supreme Court, speaking through Justices J.S. Verma, A.S. Anand, and N. Venkatachala, delivered a judgment of profound significance.¹⁷ It unequivocally declared that the award of compensation in proceedings under Article 32 (by the Supreme Court) or Article 226 (by High Courts) for the established infringement of fundamental rights is a remedy available in public law.⁶

Crucially, the Court clarified the basis of this liability. It held that this public law remedy is based on strict liability for the contravention of fundamental rights.⁶ Furthermore, it decisively ruled that the principle of sovereign immunity does not apply as a defence in these public law proceedings, even though it might be available as a defence in a private law action based on tort.⁶ This distinction between public law constitutional remedies and private law tort actions was emphasized as fundamental.¹⁴

The Court affirmed the line of cases following Rudul Sah, including Sebastian Hongray, Bhim Singh, and Saheli, noting that the compensatory jurisdiction under Articles 32 and 226 was now well-established.⁶ It stressed that this public law remedy should be “more readily available when invoked by the have-nots, who are not possessed of the wherewithal for enforcement of their rights in private law”.⁶ Relying on the District Judge’s report confirming custodial death, the Court held the State of Orissa liable and awarded Rs. 1,50,000 as compensation to Nilabati Behera.⁶ It also directed the State to initiate criminal proceedings against those responsible for the death.²¹

Nilabati Behera thus provided the definitive doctrinal clarity that constitutional tort liability is strict and immune from the defence of sovereign immunity. It solidified compensation as a primary tool for vindicating fundamental rights, especially in the context of custodial violence and death, ensuring that the State is held accountable for the actions of its agents that extinguish the basic rights of citizens.⁶

C. Analysis of Other Foundational Cases (Sebastian Hongray, Bhim Singh, Saheli)

The period between Rudul Sah and Nilabati Behera saw several other important cases that applied and consolidated the nascent compensatory jurisprudence.

• Sebastian M. Hongray v. Union of India (1984): This case involved the disappearance of two individuals after they were taken into custody by army personnel in Manipur.¹⁰ When the authorities failed to produce them despite a writ of habeas corpus, the Supreme Court, explicitly following Rudul Sah, awarded exemplary costs as compensation to their wives for the torture, agony, and harassment suffered, and for the failure of the detaining authority to account for the missing persons.⁶ This case extended the principle to situations of enforced disappearance and involved the armed forces.⁶
• Bhim Singh v. State of J&K (1985): Bhim Singh, a Member of the Legislative Assembly, was illegally arrested and detained by the police to prevent him from attending a session of the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly.¹⁰ The Supreme Court found this to be a blatant violation of his rights under Articles 21 and 22(2) (right to be produced before a magistrate). Relying on Rudul Sah and Hongray, the Court awarded Rs. 50,000 as compensation to be paid by the State for the illegal arrest and detention.⁶
• Saheli, A Women’s Resources Centre v. Commissioner of Police, Delhi (1990): This case concerned the tragic death of a nine-year-old boy due to a severe beating inflicted by a police officer.¹⁰ The Supreme Court held the Delhi Administration vicariously liable for the actions of the police officer and awarded Rs. 75,000 as compensation to the child’s mother.⁶ Significantly, the Court relied partly on the pre-Rudul Sah case of State of Rajasthan v. Vidyawati to emphasize the State’s liability for the tortious acts of its employees, distinguishing the case from the sovereign immunity shield upheld in Kasturi Lal.¹⁰

These cases collectively demonstrate the rapid acceptance and application of the compensatory principle established in Rudul Sah. They expanded its reach to cover different forms of state misconduct (disappearance, illegal arrest, custodial death) and different state actors (police, army), reinforcing the trend of utilizing monetary awards under the public law jurisdiction as a vital remedy for fundamental rights violations.

D. D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997): Interplay with Procedural Safeguards

The D.K. Basu judgment is renowned primarily for laying down extensive and mandatory procedural guidelines for arrest and detention to curb custodial violence and torture.³⁰ However, it also played a crucial role in reinforcing the constitutional tort framework. The Court explicitly recognized the connection between the breach of these procedural safeguards and the State’s liability to pay compensation.³⁰

The judgment emphasized that the preventive and punitive measures mandated (such as departmental action against errant officials or contempt proceedings) were in addition to, and not substitutes for, the victim’s right to claim full civil monetary damages through the public law remedy of constitutional tort.³⁰ Echoing Rudul Sah, the Court reiterated that fundamental rights would be rendered “illusory and futile” without effective remedies.³⁰ It reaffirmed the principle established in Nilabati Behera that the State cannot invoke sovereign immunity when its actions violate Article 21.¹⁸

The significance of D.K. Basu in the context of constitutional tort lies in its integration of procedural requirements with the substantive remedy of compensation. It created a more holistic framework where violations of specific procedural duties imposed on state officials during arrest and detention could directly trigger the State’s liability to compensate the victim under the constitutional tort doctrine, further strengthening accountability mechanisms against custodial abuse.³⁰

E. Kaushal Kishor v. State of UP (2023): Contemporary Issues and State Accountability

This recent Constitution Bench decision addressed several complex questions arising from derogatory and insensitive public statements made by government ministers concerning victims of a gang rape.³⁶ Among the key issues were the enforceability of fundamental rights (specifically Articles 19 – freedom of speech, and 21 – life and liberty) against non-state actors (horizontal application), the State’s affirmative duty to protect Article 21 rights even against threats from private individuals, the government’s vicarious liability for ministers’ statements under the principle of collective responsibility, and crucially, whether such statements could constitute an actionable ‘constitutional tort’.³⁸

The majority opinion delivered several important rulings. It held that certain fundamental rights, including those under Articles 19 and 21, can indeed be enforced even against persons other than the State or its instrumentalities, acknowledging the evolving nature of constitutional interpretation and the increasing role of non-state actors.⁴⁰ It also affirmed that the State is under an affirmative duty to protect the rights of citizens under Article 21, not only by refraining from violating them itself but also by taking necessary steps to safeguard them from infringement by private actors.³⁸

However, on the specific issue of liability for ministers’ statements, the Court exercised caution. It ruled that the government could not be held vicariously liable for every statement made by an individual minister, particularly those made outside the context of official decision-making, merely by invoking the principle of collective responsibility.⁴⁰

Most pertinent to the doctrine of constitutional tort, the Court held that a mere statement made by a minister, even if inconsistent with a citizen’s rights under Part III, would not automatically constitute an actionable constitutional tort.⁴¹ For such a statement to become actionable as a constitutional tort, it must be established that the statement led to some further act of omission or commission by state officials, resulting in harm or loss to a person/citizen.⁴¹ Justice B.V. Nagarathna, in her dissenting opinion, expressed a potentially broader view on the liability arising from such statements, suggesting a need for greater regulation of speech by public functionaries and hinting at the possibility of tort action.⁴¹

The Kaushal Kishor judgment, therefore, while expanding the horizons of fundamental rights enforcement in certain aspects (horizontal application, affirmative state duty), simultaneously delineated a boundary for constitutional tort liability arising purely from speech acts of public functionaries. It introduced a requirement of demonstrating a causal link between the statement and subsequent state action or inaction causing harm, thereby stopping short of making offensive or harmful speech by ministers, in itself, a ground for claiming constitutional tort damages against the government.⁴¹ This suggests a judicial balancing act, seeking to ensure accountability while potentially avoiding an overly broad application of vicarious liability for individual ministerial statements in the complex realm of political discourse.

The progression through these landmark cases reveals a judiciary actively engaged in crafting and refining a unique public law remedy. From the initial breakthrough in Rudul Sah to the doctrinal consolidation in Nilabati Behera, the integration with procedural safeguards in D.K. Basu, and the nuanced approach to contemporary issues in Kaushal Kishor, the Supreme Court has consistently sought to make fundamental rights, particularly the right to life and personal liberty, a tangible reality for citizens facing state power, using monetary compensation as a key instrument of constitutional enforcement and accountability.

IV. Analyzing Judicial Trends in the Application of Constitutional Tort

The development of constitutional tort jurisprudence in India reveals several discernible trends in how courts have approached state liability, the scope of public functions, interaction with other remedies, and the quantification of compensation.

A. Evolving Approaches to State Liability and Sovereign Immunity

The most striking trend is the systematic dismantling of the doctrine of sovereign immunity within the public law sphere when fundamental rights are violated.⁶ While Article 300 of the Constitution preserved the pre-constitutional position regarding state liability in general suits, the judiciary carved out an exception for the enforcement of fundamental rights under Articles 32 and 226. Starting implicitly with Rudul Sah and cemented explicitly in Nilabati Behera, the courts have consistently held that the State cannot plead sovereign immunity as a defence against a claim for compensation arising from the breach of a fundamental right by its agents.⁶ This judicial stance effectively created a zone of enhanced accountability for the State in constitutional matters, prioritizing the vindication of fundamental rights over the traditional protection afforded to the sovereign.

Concurrent with the decline of sovereign immunity in this context is the consistent application of strict liability.⁶ Once a violation of a fundamental right by a state actor is established, liability to pay compensation follows, without the claimant needing to prove negligence or fault in the traditional tort sense.¹⁸ This underscores the absolute nature of the State’s obligation to uphold fundamental rights.

Furthermore, the principle of vicarious liability is central to constitutional tort. The State, as the principal, is held liable for the wrongful acts of its employees or agents (police, army, other officials) that result in the infringement of fundamental rights.⁹ Consequently, compensation awards are typically directed to be paid from the state exchequer.⁹ While courts occasionally observe that the State is at liberty to recover the amount from the erring officials ⁶, evidence suggests this recovery mechanism is rarely effective, potentially limiting the individual deterrent effect on officials.³⁰

B. Interpretation of ‘Public Function’

The traditional distinction between ‘sovereign’ and ‘non-sovereign’ public functions, crucial for determining state liability in ordinary tort law ¹, has significantly diminished relevance in the realm of constitutional tort concerning fundamental rights.⁶ Since sovereign immunity is held inapplicable in this public law domain, the intricate exercise of classifying the function during which the right was violated becomes largely unnecessary. The judicial focus shifts decisively from the nature of the function being performed by the state agent to the fact of the fundamental right violation itself.⁶ If a state actor, irrespective of whether they are performing a traditionally ‘sovereign’ or ‘non-sovereign’ task, violates a citizen’s fundamental right, the public law remedy of compensation can be invoked based on strict liability.

C. Interaction with Other Legal Remedies (Writs, Civil Suits, Criminal Compensation)

Constitutional tort, as developed by the Indian judiciary, operates as a distinct public law remedy that co-exists with other legal avenues.⁶ The award of compensation under Articles 32 or 226 is explicitly stated to be in addition to, and not in derogation of, other remedies available to the aggrieved party.⁶ This means a victim can potentially pursue:

1. A writ petition for constitutional tort compensation (public law).
2. A civil suit for damages in tort (private law).
3. Criminal prosecution against the erring officials.

The courts have articulated several reasons for favouring the public law route via writ petitions in cases of fundamental rights violations. This route offers the possibility of relatively expeditious disposal compared to the often protracted process of civil suits.⁶ It avoids the burden of court fees, making it more accessible, particularly for poorer litigants.⁶ Crucially, it bypasses the potential defence of sovereign immunity that might obstruct a claim in a traditional tort suit.⁶ This preference implicitly highlights perceived deficiencies in the traditional civil justice system’s ability to provide timely and effective remedies against the State.⁶

While compensation is also available under criminal law, for instance, through Section 357 and 357A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, its application by criminal courts has been described as somewhat ‘tentative’ or inadequate in fully addressing the harm caused by rights violations.⁶ Constitutional tort provides a more direct mechanism focused squarely on the violation of the constitutional right itself. The co-existence of these remedies, however, does raise questions about potential overlaps and the overall coherence of the remedial landscape for state wrongs.

D. Principles and Challenges in Quantifying Compensation

A significant and persistent challenge in the application of constitutional tort is the quantification of compensation. There is a notable lack of uniform principles or a set formula guiding the courts in determining the monetary amount to be awarded.⁹ This absence can lead to inconsistencies across cases and awards that may appear ad hoc.³⁴

While not explicitly codified, courts appear implicitly to consider various factors, including:

• The nature and severity of the fundamental right violation (e.g., illegal detention vs. custodial death).
• The duration of suffering (e.g., length of unlawful incarceration).⁶
• Loss of life, considering the age, earning capacity, and dependents of the deceased.¹⁷
• The need to provide meaningful relief and potentially deter future misconduct.¹⁶

Early landmark cases saw relatively modest sums awarded (e.g., Rs. 30,000-50,000 in Rudul Sah, Bhim Singh, Saheli ⁶), whereas some later cases have involved significantly higher amounts.²⁰ This variation highlights the lack of standardized methodology.

The compensation awarded under constitutional tort might also differ philosophically from damages in private law. While private law often focuses on quantifiable losses (pecuniary and non-pecuniary) aiming for restitution ¹⁶, constitutional compensation may incorporate less tangible elements related to the violation of the right itself, the abuse of power, and the need to uphold constitutional values.¹⁶ However, the difficulty in monetizing the violation of a fundamental right, as distinct from consequential injury, poses a genuine challenge.⁵²

Practical hurdles further complicate the issue. Apart from the difficulty in determining the appropriate quantum, victims often face challenges in the timely realization of the awarded compensation, with bureaucratic delays potentially hindering enforcement.⁵¹ Attributing fault to specific state departments for payment can also be problematic.⁵¹ This lack of clear guidelines and the associated practical difficulties represent a significant weakness in the current framework, potentially undermining the effectiveness and predictability of the remedy. It signals an area where either legislative intervention or more detailed judicial standard-setting is needed to ensure greater consistency and fairness.

V. The Contemporary Status of Constitutional Tort Law in India

A. Synthesis of Established Legal Principles

Decades after its genesis, the doctrine of constitutional tort is now a firmly established feature of the Indian legal landscape. Its core principles, synthesized from landmark judgments, can be summarized as follows:

• It is a distinct public law remedy, primarily exercised under the writ jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (Article 32) and High Courts (Article 226).⁶
• It is triggered by the violation of fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution, particularly Article 21 (Right to Life and Personal Liberty), by the State or its instrumentalities.⁶
• Liability is based on the principle of strict liability; once the violation is established, the State is liable to compensate.⁶
• The defence of sovereign immunity is not applicable in constitutional tort proceedings concerning fundamental rights violations.⁶
• Monetary compensation is the primary relief awarded, serving purposes of redressal, deterrence, and vindication of rights.⁶
• This remedy is in addition to, and not exclusive of, other available legal remedies such as private law tort suits or criminal prosecution.⁶

The jurisprudence solidified significantly following the Nilabati Behera judgment in 1993, which provided clear doctrinal foundations.⁶

B. Current Application and Understanding based on Recent Judgments

Contemporary judicial practice demonstrates the continued relevance and application of constitutional tort principles. High Courts and the Supreme Court routinely invoke this doctrine to grant relief in cases involving state negligence leading to death or injury, custodial violence, illegal detention, and other breaches of fundamental rights.

For instance, recent analyses and judgments concerning deaths due to civic negligence (like falling into uncovered manholes maintained by state authorities) explicitly rely on the principles established in Nilabati Behera and D.K. Basu to award compensation under public law, emphasizing the State’s strict liability for jeopardizing the right to life under Article 21.¹⁸ Cases involving wrongful prosecution leading to prolonged incarceration have also seen High Courts invoking constitutional tort to award compensation, sometimes directing recovery from errant officials.²⁸ The Supreme Court itself continues to apply the Nilabati Behera precedent in awarding compensation for loss suffered due to state actions violating fundamental rights, such as in cases involving the death of a family member due to official negligence or inaction.¹⁵

The 2023 Kaushal Kishor judgment, while dealing with the specific context of ministerial statements, reaffirmed the broader principles of the State’s affirmative duty to protect Article 21 rights even against non-state actors and the potential for enforcing fundamental rights horizontally.⁴⁰ However, it also introduced a specific threshold for constitutional tort liability arising from speech acts, requiring a demonstrable link to subsequent state action or omission causing harm, indicating an ongoing process of refinement regarding the doctrine’s precise boundaries.⁴¹

Overall, constitutional tort remains an active and vital tool used by the higher judiciary to hold the State accountable for fundamental rights violations, demonstrating its transition from a novel judicial innovation to a standard component of Indian public law litigation.

C. Influence of Legal Scholarship and Commentary

The development and understanding of constitutional tort have been significantly influenced by legal scholarship and commentary. Academic analyses have traced its origins, examined its theoretical underpinnings, and assessed its impact.⁴ Scholars have highlighted its role as a public law remedy filling gaps left by traditional tort law and procedural hurdles.⁶

At the same time, critical perspectives exist. Some scholars argue that the overwhelming focus on constitutional remedies under writ jurisdiction may have inadvertently stifled the independent development and vitality of private law tort actions against the State in lower courts.⁵² Concerns have also been raised about the efficacy of damages as the sole remedy, particularly regarding the inconsistencies in quantification and the actual deterrent effect.⁵² The ongoing academic debate concerning the doctrine’s scope, its interaction with private law, and its practical effectiveness contributes to its continuous evaluation and potential evolution.⁵² The acceptance of the remedy by bodies like the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) also indicates its broader institutional recognition.⁶

In conclusion, constitutional tort in India today is a judicially forged, well-established public law doctrine actively employed to provide compensation for fundamental rights violations by the State. While its core principles are settled, its precise boundaries, application to new constitutional issues, and relationship with other areas of law continue to be shaped by judicial pronouncements and academic discourse, reflecting its nature as a dynamic and evolving field within Indian constitutional law.

VI. Future Directions, Challenges, and Potential Reforms

The journey of constitutional tort in India, while significant, is far from complete. Its future trajectory involves navigating persistent challenges, considering potential reforms, and adapting to emerging constitutional issues.

A. Prospective Trajectory: Expansion or Consolidation?

The future may see attempts to expand the application of constitutional tort beyond its traditional focus on Article 21 violations. Arguments could be made for extending compensatory remedies to breaches of other fundamental rights, such as rights against discrimination (Article 15) or violations of freedom of speech and expression (Article 19) where state action causes tangible harm.²⁰ Furthermore, as socio-economic rights gain greater judicial recognition, often through interpretation under Article 21 (e.g., right to health, right to a clean environment), the possibility of seeking constitutional tort compensation for their violation by the State might increase.¹³ The Kaushal Kishor ruling affirming the horizontal application of certain fundamental rights also opens up potential avenues, albeit complex ones, for claims against non-state actors performing public functions or significantly impacting fundamental rights.⁴⁰ Alternatively, the focus might shift towards consolidating the existing principles, particularly refining the methodology for quantifying compensation and ensuring more effective enforcement. International human rights jurisprudence on remedies and reparations could also influence future developments.¹⁶

B. Persistent Challenges: Legislative Gaps, Proof, Enforcement

Despite its judicial establishment, constitutional tort operates within a challenging environment marked by several persistent issues:

1. Legislative Vacuum: The most significant challenge remains the absence of a comprehensive statute governing state liability in tort, including constitutional tort compensation.⁵ Decades of Law Commission recommendations for such legislation have gone unheeded.⁵ This forces the judiciary into a quasi-legislative role, leading to case-by-case development which can lack predictability and coherence.⁴ This legislative gap is a primary impediment to the systematic and consistent application of state liability principles.
2. Burden and Standard of Proof: While strict liability applies once a violation is proven, establishing the violation itself, particularly against state actors who may control evidence, can be difficult. Public law remedies often require a high standard of proof, demanding clear and incontrovertible evidence of the rights violation by state agents.⁹
3. Quantification Issues: As previously discussed, the lack of clear guidelines for calculating compensation leads to inconsistency and unpredictability, potentially undermining the remedy’s fairness and deterrent effect.⁹
4. Enforcement and Realization: Securing the awarded compensation can be another battle, with victims sometimes facing significant delays in payment from state authorities.⁵¹
5. Fault Attribution: Identifying the specific government department or agency responsible for payment can pose practical hurdles.⁵¹
6. Accountability of Officials: The principle of state vicarious liability means the state exchequer bears the cost. While theoretically possible, recovery from the individual officials responsible for the violation is rare and often not pursued vigorously by the State, which may weaken the personal deterrent effect of the compensation award.⁶

C. Analysis of Law Commission Recommendations (Tort Reform, Wrongful Prosecution)

The Law Commission of India has repeatedly addressed issues pertinent to state liability and compensation, offering potential pathways for reform:

• General Tort Reform: The foundational recommendation from the First Law Commission Report (1956) to abolish the sovereign/non-sovereign distinction and enact a general law on state tort liability remains highly relevant.⁴ Enacting such legislation would provide a comprehensive framework, potentially reducing reliance on judicial innovation through constitutional tort for all types of state wrongs.
• Wrongful Prosecution/Detention: The Law Commission’s 277th Report (2018) specifically addressed the ‘miscarriage of justice’ resulting from wrongful prosecution.²³ It recommended enacting a legal framework to provide compensation, defining wrongful prosecution broadly to include malicious or negligent investigation/prosecution of an innocent person.²⁷ Key proposals included establishing Special Courts for expeditious disposal, placing the burden of proof on the claimant (on a balance of probabilities), and providing for both monetary and non-pecuniary relief (like counseling, vocational training).²³ This report highlights a critical area where constitutional tort principles could be codified and structured. However, the debate continues on the appropriate standard – the Commission leaned towards malice, while critics argue negligence should suffice for better access to justice, balanced against concerns about overwhelming the system.²⁷ This dilemma underscores the complex policy choices involved, choices that remain unresolved due to legislative inaction.
• Custodial Deaths (Evidence Act Sec 114-B): The long-pending recommendation from 1985 to introduce a rebuttable presumption of culpability against police in cases of custodial death or injury (Section 114-B, Evidence Act) remains unimplemented.³⁰ Enacting this would significantly ease the burden of proof for victims seeking remedies, including constitutional tort compensation, in such cases.

D. Academic Critiques and Judicial Observations on Limitations

The doctrine is not without its critics. Some legal scholars argue that the judiciary’s focus on developing public law remedies via writ jurisdiction has come at the cost of neglecting and potentially undermining the development of a robust private law of torts applicable to the State in the regular civil courts.⁵² This ‘constitutionalization’ of tort law, while providing relief in specific high-profile cases, might weaken the overall private law structure.⁵⁴ Doubts have also been expressed regarding the actual efficacy of monetary compensation alone as a deterrent, especially given the inconsistencies in quantification and the fact that the burden often falls on the taxpayer rather than the erring official.⁵² Furthermore, observations exist regarding instances of judicial conservatism or reluctance in awarding substantial compensation, sometimes resorting to token amounts, which can dilute the remedy’s impact.⁵¹

E. Impact of Emerging Constitutional Issues

The landscape of constitutional rights is continually evolving, presenting new challenges and potential applications for constitutional tort. Violations related to data privacy by state agencies, environmental degradation resulting from state inaction or negligence ⁵⁵, or discrimination facilitated by state policies in emerging areas could potentially become grounds for constitutional tort claims. The affirmation of horizontal applicability of certain fundamental rights in Kaushal Kishor might also lead to attempts, however challenging, to extend constitutional tort principles to non-state entities performing critical public functions where their actions lead to fundamental rights violations.⁴⁰

Addressing the persistent challenges, particularly the legislative vacuum and the practical hurdles in implementation (quantification, enforcement, official accountability), is crucial for the future development of constitutional tort. Without legislative action providing a comprehensive framework, the doctrine will likely continue its incremental, judge-led evolution, responding to specific cases but potentially lacking the overall coherence and predictability that a statutory regime could offer. The tension between the doctrine’s laudable aim of providing swift and effective justice for fundamental rights violations and the practical difficulties in achieving this aim consistently remains a central theme for its future.

VII. Conclusion

The doctrine of constitutional tort represents a significant and unique contribution of the Indian judiciary to the global jurisprudence of human rights enforcement and state accountability. Born out of the necessity to bridge the gap between the constitutional promise of fundamental rights and the inadequacies of traditional legal remedies against the State, it has evolved over four decades into an established public law mechanism. Its journey, from the foundational pronouncement in Rudul Sah to the doctrinal clarifications in Nilabati Behera and subsequent refinements, showcases a judiciary actively shaping the law to ensure that violations of fundamental rights, particularly the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21, do not go unredressed.

The core achievements of this jurisprudence are profound: the effective neutralization of the archaic sovereign immunity defence in the context of fundamental rights violations, the application of strict liability to hold the State accountable for the actions of its agents, and the provision of monetary compensation as a tangible remedy accessible through the relatively expeditious writ jurisdiction. This has provided a crucial avenue for justice, especially for victims of custodial violence, illegal detention, and other forms of state excess, who might otherwise be lost in the labyrinth of conventional litigation.

However, the doctrine’s contemporary status is marked by significant challenges that temper its success. The persistent failure of the legislature to enact a comprehensive law on state liability, despite long-standing recommendations from the Law Commission, leaves the field dependent on judicial development, resulting in gaps and inconsistencies. The lack of clear guidelines for quantifying compensation remains a major weakness, potentially leading to arbitrary awards and undermining predictability. Practical hurdles related to proof, timely enforcement of awards, and the lack of effective mechanisms to ensure individual accountability of erring officials further dilute the doctrine’s potential impact.

Looking ahead, the future of constitutional tort in India hinges on addressing these challenges. While the judiciary will likely continue its vigilant oversight and incremental development of the doctrine, a comprehensive legislative framework governing state liability and compensation for rights violations would provide much-needed clarity, consistency, and coherence. Such legislation could formally abolish the sovereign/non-sovereign distinction, establish clear standards for liability and compensation, and create effective enforcement mechanisms. Until such legislative action is undertaken, constitutional tort will remain a vital, yet imperfect, testament to the Indian judiciary’s commitment to breathing life into the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Its continued evolution and application will be critical in the ongoing effort to balance state power with individual liberty and ensure meaningful accountability in the world’s largest democracy.

VIII. Bibliography

Cases:

• Bhim Singh v. State of J&K, (1985) 4 SCC 677. ⁶
• D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 416. ¹⁸
• Kaushal Kishor v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2023) 4 SCC 1. ⁴⁴
• Khatri (II & IV) v. State of Bihar, (1981) 1 SCC 627 & (1981) 2 SCC 493. (Referenced in analysis based on ¹⁴)
• Kasturi Lal Ralia Ram Jain v. State of U.P, AIR 1965 SC 1039. (Referenced in analysis based on ¹⁴)
• Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, (1993) 2 SCC 746. ⁶
• P & O Steam Navigation Co. v. Secretary of State for India, (1861) 5 Bom HCR App 1. (Referenced in analysis)
• Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar, (1983) 4 SCC 141. ⁶
• Saheli, A Women’s Resources Centre v. Commissioner of Police, Delhi, (1990) 1 SCC 422. ⁶
• Sebastian M. Hongray v. Union of India, (1984) 1 SCC 339. ⁶
• State of Rajasthan v. Vidyawati, AIR 1962 SC 933. (Referenced in analysis based on ¹⁰)

Statutes & Constitutional Provisions:

• Constitution of India, 1950 (Articles 12, 19, 21, 22, 32, 142, 226, 300). ¹
• Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Sections 176, 357, 357A, 197). ¹⁷
• Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Proposed Section 114-B). ³⁰
• Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Sections 302, 304A, 378). ¹⁷
• Government of India Act, 1915. ¹
• Government of India Act, 1935. ¹
• Government of India Act, 1858. ⁵
• Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993. ⁵⁷

Law Commission of India Reports:

• Law Commission of India, First Report, Liability of the State in Tort (1956). ⁴
• Law Commission of India, Report on Section 114-B, Indian Evidence Act (1985). (Referenced based on ³⁰)
• Law Commission of India, Report No. 277, Wrongful Prosecution (Miscarriage of Justice): Legal Remedies (2018). ²³
• Law Commission of India, Report No. 223, Need for Ameliorating the lot of the Have-nots – Supreme Court’s Judgments (2009). ⁵⁹
• Law Commission of India, Report on Limitation Act, 1963. ⁶⁰
• Law Commission of India, Report on Man-made Disasters. ⁶¹

Academic Articles, Books, and Other Sources (Referenced via Snippets):

• Abraham, Haim. Tort Liability in Warfare: States’ Wrongs and Civilians’ Rights (Mentioned in ⁶²).
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• Balganesh, Shyamkrishna. “The Constitutionalization of Indian Private Law.” Columbia Journal of Asian Law (Implied by ⁵⁴).
• Bandes, Susan. Articles on Constitutional Tort (Referenced in ⁶⁴).
• Bobek, Michal, et al. Transition 2.0: Re-establishing Constitutional Democracy (2023). ⁶⁵
• Borthakur, Richa. “Sovereign Immunity in India: A Quantitative Analysis.” Pen Acclaims Journal, Vol. 12 (2020). ⁴
• Bublick, Ellen. Articles on Torts (Referenced in ⁶⁶).
• Chowdhury, Sohini. Live Law article on Collegium (2023). ⁶⁷
• Eaton, Thomas A. “Affirmative Duty and Constitutional Tort.” University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform (1982). ⁶⁴
• Engstrom, Nora Freeman & Robert L. Rabin. Articles on Torts (Referenced in ⁶⁶).
• Epstein, Richard A. Articles on Torts (Referenced in ⁶⁴).
• Gupta, Ambika. “Custodial Torture A Blatant Infraction of Human Rights and its Reparations: Nilabati Behera V. State of Orissa.” International Journal of Law Management & Humanities, Vol. 3, Iss 4 (2020). ²²
• International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ). Reports on Judicial Reparations (2024). ⁶⁸
• Khanna, Anirudh. “Compensation as a Remedy in Public Law.” SCC Online Blog (2024). ²⁰
• Kumar, S Sanal. “Compensation for wrongful prosecution, incarceration and conviction.” Bar and Bench (2022). ¹⁵
• Manral, Mahender Singh. News report on custodial deaths (Referenced in ¹⁷).
• Maniyar, Zahid. Bail Orders (Referenced in ⁶⁹).
• Mehta, Pratap Bhanu. “Wrongful Prosecution and Miscarriage of Justice: Legal Remedies.” Jus Corpus Law Journal (2022). ²³
• Parthasarathy, Suhrith. “Wrongful Prosecution (Miscarriage of Justice): Legal Remedies (Law Commission of India Report No. 277).” SCC Online Blog (2018). ²³
• Ramanujan, T.V. Reference in Kishore Kumar v. PK Sekhar Babu (2024). ⁴⁴
• Schwab, Stewart J. & Theodore Eisenberg. “Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation.” Cornell Law Review (1988). ⁷⁰
• Shelton, Dinah. Writings on Human Rights Damages (Quoted in ⁵⁶).
• Sisk, Gregory C. “The Common-Law Tort Remedy for Federal Official Wrongdoing.” Notre Dame Law Review (2021). ⁷¹
• Sijoria, Siddharth. “Time to enact legal framework on compensation for victims of wrongful imprisonment.” Bar and Bench (2021). ²⁸
• Surendranath, Anup. Writings on Death Penalty (Referenced in ²⁷).
• Tharoor, Shashi. “The Scope of Changes in the Criminal Law System of India.” International Journal of Law & Legal Jurisprudence Studies (2022). ⁷²
• Various Authors. Journal of Legal Studies, NLUD, Vol. 2 (2020). ⁷³
• Various Authors. Banaras Law Journal, Vol. 51, No. 1 (2022). ³³
• Various Authors. Chanakya National Law University Journal, Vol. 8 (2019). ⁵⁵
• Various Authors. Consortium Law Review, MNLU Nagpur, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2021). ⁷⁴
• Various Authors. International Journal of Law and Legal Research, Vol. 4, Iss 1 (2022). ³⁴
• Various Authors. International Journal of Legal Research and Studies, Vol. 3, Iss 1 (2018). ²⁴
• Various Authors. NLS Business Law Review. (Implied reference in context of Jotwell ⁶⁶)
• Various Authors. NLSIR. ²⁷
• Various Authors. NLSJ. ⁵²
• Various Authors. Northwestern University Law Review. ⁷⁰
• Various Authors. NYU Journal of International Law and Politics. ⁵⁶
• Various Authors. Real Property, Trust and Estate Law Journal, Vol. 44, No. 1 (2009). ⁷⁵
• Various Authors. University of Virginia Lawyer (Spring 2023). ⁷⁶
• Various Authors. Michigan Law Review. ⁶⁴
• Various Authors. University of Pennsylvania Law Review. ⁵⁴
• Venkatesan, G. “Emerging Trends in Law of Torts.” International Journal of Law Management & Humanities. ²
• Verma, J.S. (Former NHRC Chairperson). Speeches/Writings (Referenced in ⁴⁹).
• Whitman, Christina B. Articles on Constitutional Tort (Referenced in ⁶⁴).
• Winfield, Percy Henry. Winfield on Tort (Definition referenced in ²).
• Salmond, John William. Salmond on the Law of Torts (Definition referenced in ²).
• Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy Blog (indconlawphil.wordpress.com). ¹⁶
• iPleaders Blog. ³
• Libertatem Magazine. ⁹
• Law Trend. ⁵⁷
• Drishti Judiciary. ⁴¹
• LawBhoomi. ¹²
• Jus Corpus Law Journal. ¹⁷
• Centre for Law and Policy Research (CLPR). ¹⁰
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• International Environmental Law Research Centre (IELRC). ⁶
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• University Course Syllabi (Delhi University LL.M.). ¹¹
• PhD Theses (North Bengal University ¹, IIUI Islamabad ⁵⁸).
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